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Abstract—Information security in the cloud presents a serious
challenge. We have identified fundamental weaknesses when
undertaking cloud audit, namely the misconceptions surrounding
the purpose of audit, what comprises a proper audit trail, what
should be included, and how it should be achieved and main-
tained. A properly specified audit trail can provide a powerful
tool in the armoury against cyber-crime, yet it is all too easy
to throw away the benefits offered by this simple tool through
lack of understanding, incompetence, mis-configuration or sheer
laziness. Of course, merely having an effective audit trail is not
enough — we actually have to examine it regularly to realise the
potential benefits it offers.
Keywords—security; privacy; audit; audit trail.
I. INTRODUCTION
Achieving information security is not a trivial process.
When this involves a cloud setting, the problem intensifies
exponentially. Let us first consider how we go about achieving
security. Usually, it is achieved by means of compliance
with standards, assurance or audit. We provide some useful
background on this in [1]. In a non-cloud setting, we have
a range of established standards which are well understood
by industry. However, when we move to cloud, everything
changes. There are an extensive range of cloud standard setting
bodies, yet there remains no definitive cloud security standard.
Assurance in non-cloud settings is well understood, but
assurance in a cloud setting is less well understood. There are
many challenges to overcome and, with Pym, we addressed
some of those in earlier work [2] developing a conceptual
framework for cloud security assurance, where we addressed:
standards, proposed management method and complexity.
One of the fundamental tools that can be used to help
ensure cloud security is the simple audit trail. There are,
of course, many other challenges, and we revisit these in
Section II, where we look at the definition of security goals,
compliance with cloud security standards, audit issues, the
impact of management approaches on security, and how com-
plexity, the lack of responsibility and accountability affect
cloud security. The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows: in Section III, we discuss cloud audit, state of the art;
in Section IV, we consider misconceptions prevalent across
different disciplines of what exactly the audit trail is; in
Section V, we discuss how we might improve audit trails in a
cloud setting. In Section VI, we discuss our conclusions.
II. CLOUD SECURITY CHALLENGES
A number of challenges need to be addressed in order
to achieve the goal of good security. The fundamental con-
cepts of information security are confidentiality, integrity, and
availability (CIA), a concept developed in an environment
using agency theory to manage director self-interest and inter-
corporate transactions. Agency theory recognizes the need to
align the objective of agent with principal, though this has been
shown to be difficult to achieve in practice. Cloud security is
no different, which suggests a different approach is needed.
Ten key security issues have been identified, namely:
• The definition of security goals;
• Compliance with standards;
• Audit issues;
• Management approach;
• Technical complexity of cloud;
• Lack of responsibility and accountability;
• Measurement and monitoring;
• Management attitude to security;
• Security culture in the company;
• The threat environment.
Looking at the definition of security goals, we recog-
nise that the business environment is constantly changing,
as are corporate governance rules and this would clearly
imply changing security measures are required to keep up
to date. More emphasis is now placed on responsibility and
accountability [3], social conscience [4], sustainability [5] [6],
resilience [7] and ethics [8]. Responsibility and accountability
are, in effect, mechanisms we can use to help achieve all the
other security goals. As social conscience and ethics are very
closely related, we can expand the traditional CIA triad to
include sustainability, resilience and ethics. This expansion of
CIA can help address some of the shortcomings of agency
theory, but also provides a perfect fit to stewardship theory.
Stewardship carries a broader acceptance of responsibility than
the self-interest embedded in agency, extending to acting in the
interests of company owners, society and the environment as
a whole. Broadening the definition of security goals gives a
more effective way to achieve successful cloud audit, but the
added complexity cloud brings may complicate the audit trail.
In earlier work with Pym [2], we developed a conceptual
framework to address cloud security. We identified three barri-
ers to good cloud security: standards compliance, management
method and complexity. We addressed compliance with stan-
dards in [1]. The lack of coherent cloud standards undermines
the effectiveness of cloud audit and highlights a fundamental
weakness in that process [9] — the use of checklists.
We also considered management method [10], where we
addressed the cloud security issue with management method,
arguing that historic reliance on agency theory to run compa-
nies can undermine effective security. We addressed complex-
ity along with the difficulties in addressing measurement [11],
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which can complicate effective audit. In [12], we addressed
the lack of responsibility and accountability in standard service
level agreements (SLAs). This area has been much neglected,
but there are signs that it is being taken more seriously.
On the matter of achieving compliance with standards in
practice, we have identified the use of assurance to achieve
security through compliance and audit. Turning first to com-
pliance, there are a number of challenges to address. Since
the evolution of cloud computing, a number of cloud security
standards have evolved, but the problem is that there is still no
standard which offers complete security — there is no “one
size covers all”, which is a limitation. Even compliance with all
standards will not guarantee complete security, which, presents
another disadvantage [1]. The pace of evolution of new tech-
nology far outstrips the capability of international standards
organisations to keep up with the changes [13], adding to the
problem and meaning it may not be resolved any time soon.
We have argued that companies need to take account of these
gaps in the standards when addressing compliance. Reliance on
compliance alone will undermine effective security. Some key
areas above we will not address here. Management attitude to
security, the importance of developing a strong security culture
in the company, and looking at the threat environment are all
areas that merit more extensive and specific research.
We have also considered weaknesses in the approach to
cloud audit [14], and we expand on that work here. It is
certainly the case that cloud audit is not a mature field, and
much early work on cloud audit has focussed on addressing
technical issues. We have long held the view that focussing
on technical issues alone can never solve cloud security. The
business architecture of a company comprises people, process
and technology [15], not technology alone, thus focussing on
a technical solution alone is likely to undermine security.
III. CLOUD AUDIT, THE STATE OF THE ART
Vouk [16], in an early description of cloud computing
issues, suggests there must be an ability to audit processes, data
and processing results, but does not propose a solution. Wang
et al. [17] address how the cloud paradigm brings about many
new security challenges, which have not been well understood.
The authors study the problem of ensuring the integrity of data
storage in cloud computing, in particular, the task of allowing
a third party auditor (TPA), working on behalf of the cloud
client, to verify the integrity of the dynamic data stored in the
cloud. The authors identify the difficulties, potential security
problems and show how to construct an elegant verification
scheme for seamless integration of these features into protocol
design, but this relies on the willingness of the cloud service
provider (CSP) to permit the TPA entry to their systems.
Leavitt [18] suggests CSPs will not be able to pass
customer audits if they cannot demonstrate who has access
to their data and how they prevent unauthorised personnel
from retrieving information. Again, there is no detail given
on how to address this. Some CSPs address this by appointing
TPAs to audit their systems in advance, and by documenting
procedures designed to address customers’ data security needs.
Bernstein et al. [19] are excited by the prospect of a “cloud of
clouds”, but are worried about the security processes used to
ensure connectivity to the correct server on the other clouds,
suggesting some kind of audit-ability would be needed. The
authors stress the need for cloud systems to provide strong and
secure audit trails, but do not suggest how this might be done.
Pearson and Benameur [20] recognise that achieving proper
audit trails in the cloud is an unresolved issue. Wang et al.
[21] address privacy preserving public auditing for data storage
security in cloud, and are keen to prevent TPA introduced
weaknesses to the system, presenting a mechanism to enable a
more secure approach to public audit by TPAs. Development
of the algorithms is at an early stage and the authors note
further improvement needs to take place. Zhou et al. [22]
carry out a survey on security and privacy in cloud computing,
investigating several CSPs about their concerns on security
and privacy issues, and find those concerns are inadequate.
The authors suggest more should be added in terms of five
aspects (i.e., availability, confidentiality, data integrity, control
and audit) for security, but do not provide any detail. Chen and
Yoon [23] present a framework for secure cloud computing
through IT auditing by establishing a general framework
using checklists by following data flow and its life-cycle. The
checklists are made based on the cloud deployment models and
cloud services models, see [9] for our views on checklists.
Armbrust et al. [24] present a detailed description of what
cloud computing is, and note that the possible lack of audit-
ability presents the number three barrier to implementation,
without proposing any solution. Ramgovind et al. [25] provide
an overall security perspective of cloud computing with the aim
of highlighting the security concerns that should properly be
addressed and managed to realise the full potential of cloud
computing. The authors note that possible unwillingness of
CSPs to undergo audit presents a real barrier to acceptance and
take up. Grobauer et al. [26] note that discussions about cloud
computing security often fail to distinguish general issues from
cloud-specific issues. The authors express concern that many
CSPs do not do enough to ensure the provision of good cloud
audit practice and hence evidence proper security.
Doelitzscher et al. [27] present a prototype demonstration
of Security Audit as a Service (SAaaS) architecture, a cloud
audit system which aims to increase trust in cloud infrastruc-
tures by introducing more transparency to both user and cloud
provider on what is happening in the cloud. This system aims
to keep track of changes to the infrastructure as VMs are
deployed, moved or shut down. Hale and Gamble [28] note
that current SLAs focus on quality of service metrics and lack
the semantics needed to express security constraints that could
be used to measure risk. The authors present a framework,
called SecAgreement (SecAg), that extends the current SLA
negotiation standard to allow security metrics to be expressed
on service description terms and service level objectives. The
framework seeks to provide a lightweight approach, which can
leave some weaknesses not fully addressed.
Pappas et al. [29] present CloudFence, a framework that al-
lows users to independently audit the treatment of their private
data by third-party online services, through the intervention
of the cloud provider that hosts these services. The authors
demonstrate that CloudFence requires just a few changes to
existing application code, while it can detect and prevent a
wide range of security breaches, ranging from data leakage
attacks using SQL injection, to personal data disclosure due to
missing or erroneously implemented access control checks. It
addresses data held by a CSP, but does not claim to provide
a complete audit trail. Xie and Gamble [30] outline a tiered
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approach to auditing information in the cloud, but with little
detail provided. The approach provides perspectives on audit-
able events that may include compositions of independently
formed audit trails. Zhu et al. [30] propose the use of provable
data possession (PDP), a cryptographic technique for verifying
the integrity of data, without retrieving it, as part of a means of
carrying out audit on the data. This tool can prove the integrity
of data, but does not consider who has accessed the data.
Ruebsamen and Reich [31] propose the use of software
agents to carry out continuous audit processing and report-
ing. The authors propose continuous audit to address the
dynamically changing nature of cloud use, so as to ensure
evidence concerning vital periods of use are not missed. The
use of a separate evidence store is a major plus, and the tools
developed look very interesting. The authors note that an audit
of the cloud layer alone will not be enough. Doelitzscher
et al. [32] propose the use of neural networks to analyse
and learn the normal usage behaviour of cloud customers, so
that anomalies which originate from a cloud security incident
caused by a compromised virtual machine can be detected.
While retrospective tests on collected data have proved very
effective, the system has yet to reach a sufficient level of
maturity to be deployed in a live environment.
Doelitzscher et al. [33] present a cloud audit policy lan-
guage for their SAaaS architecture. The authors describe the
design and implementation of the automated audit system of
virtual machine images, which ensures legal and company
policies are complied with. They also discuss how on-demand
software audit agents that maintain and validate the security
compliance of running cloud services are deployed. Thorpe et
al. [34] present a framework for forensic based auditing of
cloud logs. The authors explore the requirements of a cloud
log forensics service oriented architecture (SOA) framework
for performing effective digital investigation examinations in
these abstract web services environments. Of course, these
services need to be activated and protected before these tools
can be deployed. Wang et al. [35] propose a secure cloud
storage system supporting privacy-preserving public auditing.
The authors further extend their proposal to enable the TPA
to perform audits for multiple users simultaneously and effi-
ciently, an improvement on earlier work.
Lopez et al. [36] propose privacy-friendly cloud audits
by applying Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) and
Public-Key Searchable Encryption (PEKS) to the collection
of digital evidence. The authors show that their solution can
provide client privacy preserving audit data to cloud auditors.
Whilst good for privacy, this does not cover all angles.
Shameli-Sendi and Cheriet [37] propose a framework for
assessing the security risks associated with cloud computing
platforms, but propose no solution on how to achieve a
high standard of audit. Xiong and Chen [38] consider how
to allocate sufficient computing resources, but not to over-
provision them, to process and analyse audit logs for ensuring
the guarantee of security of an SLA, referred to as the SLA-
based resource allocation problem, for high-performance cloud
auditing. This is interesting because of the tools developed.
However, it is geared toward enforcement of SLAs in high
performance computing, rather than for security auditing.
The common theme running through much of this work is
that there is a recognition of the need for proper audit, but
little idea of how to go about it. Where tools are developed,
many are excellent for what they are designed for, but do not
offer a complete solution to the problem. It is clear that the
consistent lack of input from the accounting profession is not
helping advance the state of the art, and we would call for more
input from the accounting profession. Cloud computing is such
a radical change from traditional computing approaches, that
we now need to involve a wider range of disciplines, working
together to try to address what represents a major challenge.
IV. THE AUDIT TRAIL
Auditing in the accountancy world has enjoyed the benefit
of over a century of practice and experience, yet there re-
main differences of opinion with a number of problems yet
to be resolved. Duncan and Whittington [1] provide some
background on this issue. Cloud computing audit can not be
considered a mature field, and there will be some way to go
before it can catch up with the reflection and rigour of the
accounting profession. An obvious area of weakness arises
when taking audit professionals from the accounting world out
of their comfort zone, and placing them in a more technical
field. Equally, the use of people with a computing background
can overcome some of these issues, but their lack of audit
background presents another weakness.
A fundamental element of the audit process is the audit
trail, and having two disciplines involved in providing cloud
audit services means we have two different disciplines to
contend with, namely accounting professionals and security
professionals. An obvious concern is what is meant by the term
“audit trail”. It is easy to assume that everyone is talking about
the same thing, but is that actually the case? To an accounting
professional, the meaning of an audit trail is very clear.
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) [39] has two useful
definitions of an audit trail: “(a) Accounting: a means of
verifying the detailed transactions underlying any item in an
accounting record; (b) Computing: a record of the computing
processes which have been applied to a particular set of
source data, showing each stage of processing and allowing the
original data to be reconstituted; a record of the transactions
to which a database or a file has been subjected”. This
suggests common understanding, but often this is not evident
in computing research.
Some 20 years ago, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) [40] provided, in the context of computing
security, a very detailed description of what an audit trail is,
and this is wholly consistent with the OED definition. When
we look at the definitions in use in some cloud audit research
papers, we start to see a less rigorous understanding of what
an audit trail is. For example, Bernstein [19] suggests the audit
trail comprises: events, logs, and analysis thereof, Chaula [41]
suggests: raw data, analysis notes, preliminary development
and analysis information, processes notes, etc.
Pearson et al. [20] recognise that achieving proper audit
trails in the cloud is an unresolved issue. Ko et al. [42]
explicitly note that steps need to be taken to prevent audit
trails disappearing after a cloud instance is shut down. Ko
[43] recognises the need to collect a multiplicity of layers of
log data, including transactional audit trails in order to ensure
accountability in the cloud. The EU Article 29 Working Party
[44] raises several cloud-specific security risks, such as loss of
governance, insecure or incomplete data deletion, insufficient
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audit trails or isolation failures, which are not sufficiently
addressed by existing Safe Harbor principles on data security.
The audit trail can be a very powerful tool in the fight
against attack. Just as the audit trail offers forensic accountants
a means to track down fraudulent behaviour in a company, so
the audit trail in a cloud setting, providing it can be properly
protected against attack, offers forensic scientists an excellent
basis to track intrusions and other wrongdoing. In the event
of a catastrophic attack, it should be possible to reconstruct
the system that has been attacked, in order to either prove the
integrity of the system values, or in a worst case scenario,
reconstruct the system from scratch. The redundancy offered
by the simple audit trail, often seen by many as an unnecessary
duplication, will prove invaluable in the event of compromise.
Many cloud users are punctilious about setting up proper
audit trails, but sometimes forget that when a virtual machine
(VM) running in the cloud is shut down, everything, includ-
ing the audit trail data they have so assiduously collected,
disappears as soon as the VM shuts down [42], unless steps
are taken to prevent this loss. In real world conditions, most
database software ships with inadequate audit trail provision
in the default settings. Anderson [45] states that the audit trail
should only be capable of being read by users. While it is
simple enough to restrict users to read-only access, this does
not apply to the system administrators. This presents an issue
where an intruder gets into a system, escalates privileges until
root access is obtained, and is then free to manipulate, or delete
the audit trail entries in order to cover their tracks.
Cloud users often assume that the VMs they are running
will be under their sole control. However, the VMs run on
someone else’s hardware — the CSP’s, who also employ
system administrators, and sometimes employ temporary staff,
some of whom are also system administrators. While the CSP
may vet their own staff to a high level, this is often overlooked
with temporary employees. Network connections too are often
virtualised, opening up yet more avenues of attack.
A cloud user can take as many steps to secure their business
as they wish, but a key ingredient in the equation is the fact
that all cloud processes run on somebody else’s hardware, and
often software too — the CSP’s. The cloud relationship needs
to include the CSP as a key partner in the pursuit of achieving
security [12]. Unless and until CSPs are willing to share this
goal, technical solutions will be doomed to failure.
V. HOW CAN WE IMPROVE THE AUDIT TRAIL?
These vulnerabilities are not new, and are well known
to security professionals, and while many companies do use
security professionals, many do not. Regardless, companies
continue to be breached. As stated in the introduction, achiev-
ing information security is not a trivial process, but in a
cloud setting, this becomes far more difficult, due to the
complexity of relationships between myriad actors involved
in cloud ecosystems, as well as the other issues discussed in
Section II. Audit is difficult. Cloud audit is far more difficult,
with far more weaknesses to overcome. Proper audit trails
alone will not solve cloud security, but will go a long way
to helping with this goal if some simple steps are taken.
In the accounting world, an understanding of exactly what
is meant by an audit trail, and its importance, is a fundamental
part of the training every accountant undertakes. Looking at the
literature on cloud audit, it is obvious that there is a need for
input from the accounting profession, and the authors would
wish to encourage and see more input from that source. It is
clear that there is no shortage of input on the technical side, but
the authors believe there is room for a valuable contribution
to be made by the accounting profession, with many lessons
learned over many decades. There is also no doubt that further
work is needed, and work on audit trails can prove to be both
cost effective and productive in helping with security.
Some interesting work is being done on information flow
control and legal issues in cloud [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51]
which we believe, while a little light on the audit side, has the
potential to offer good improvements to cloud users to enhance
their security and privacy, and to achieve compliance.
In looking at the current approach to the use of the audit
trail, there are three fundamental weaknesses which need to
be addressed, yet which are relatively simple to address. First,
inadequate default logging options can result in insufficient
data being collected for the audit trail. Second, there is a lack
of recognition that the audit trail data can be accessed by a
malicious user gaining root privileges, which can lead to the
removal of key data showing who compromised the system,
and what they did once they had control of it. Third, failure to
ensure log data is properly collected and moved to permanent
storage can lead to loss of audit trail data, either when an
instance is shut down, or when it is compromised. These
weaknesses apply equally to cloud and non-cloud systems.
On the first point, we look at one of the most popular
open source database programmes in general use today —
MySQL. The vast majority of implementations use standard
default settings on installation, or install the programme as part
of a standard Linux, Apache, MySQL and PHP (LAMP) server.
With a LAMP server, all four of the constituent elements are
set up using the default settings. This works very well for
easy functionality “out of the box”, which is the aim of a
LAMP server. But, this does not adequately address security
in the four elements of the LAMP server, and applies equally
to cloud and non-cloud systems.
MySQL offers the following audit trail options:
• Error log — Problems encountered starting, running, or
stopping mysqld;
• General query log — Established client connections and
statements received from clients;
• Binary log — Statements that change data (also used for
replication);
• Relay log — Data changes received from a replication
master server;
• Slow query log — Queries that took more than
long query time seconds to execute;
• DDL log (metadata log) — Metadata operations per-
formed by Data Definition Language (DDL) statements.
By default, no logs are enabled, except the error log on
Windows. Some versions of Linux send the Error log to syslog.
Oracle offer an audit plugin for Enterprise (paid) Editions
of MySQL. This allows a range of events to be logged,
but again, by default, most are not enabled. The MariaDB
company, whose author originally wrote MySQL, have their
own open source audit plug-in, and offer a version suitable for
MySQL. It has the following functionality:
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• CONNECTION — Logs connects, disconnects and failed
connects (including the error code);
• QUERY — Queries issued and their results (in plain
text), including failed queries due to syntax or permission
errors;
• TABLE — Which tables were affected by query execu-
tion;
• QUERY DDL — Works as the ‘QUERY’ value, but
filters only DDL-type queries (CREATE, ALTER, etc);
• QUERY DML — Works as the ‘QUERY’ value, but
filters only Data Manipulation Language (DML) DML-
type queries (INSERT, UPDATE, etc).
By default, logging is set to off. Thus, those users who rely
on default settings for their systems are immediately putting
themselves at a severe disadvantage.
On the second point, as Anderson [45] states, the audit trail
should only be capable of being read by users. This presents
a problem in a cloud setting, where the software being used
is running on someone else’s hardware. There is a risk of
compromise from an outside user with malicious intent. There
is also a risk of compromise by someone working for the CSP.
While the CSP may well take vetting of staff seriously, there
may be situations that arise where a temporary contract worker
is engaged at short notice who is subject to lesser scrutiny. This
applies equally to cloud and non-cloud systems.
Looking at the third point, where MySQL data logging is
actually switched on, all data is logged to the running instance.
This means the data remains accessible to any intruder who
successfully breaches the system, allowing them to cover
their own tracks by deleting any entries which relate to their
intrusion of the system, or to simply delete the entire audit
trail files. And, when the running instance is shut down, all
the data disappears anyway. In a non-cloud situation, the data
is still visible to the attacker, but the forensic trail may still be
left for investigation. However, in a cloud instance, if the data
is not safely stored and the running instance is shut down, the
forensic trail is more likely to be permanently lost.
These three points are not generally considered, yet they
present a serious weakness to the success of maintaining the
audit trail. Yet, these are relatively trivial to address by simply
turning on data logging and sending all log output to an
independent secure server under the control of the cloud user.
Adding an Intrusion Detection system (IDS) is also a useful
additional precaution to take, and this should be run on an
independent secure server under the control of the cloud user.
Using an audit plug-in in addition to all the basic logging
capabilities, is also a useful thing to do. While there may be
some double processing involved, it is better to have more data
than none at all. Where the MySQL instance forms part of a
LAMP server, it would be prudent to make some elementary
security changes to the setup of the Linux operating system,
the Apache web server, and to harden the PHP installation.
It is rather worrying that in 2012, [52] report an average of
6 months between breach and discovery, a clear indication that
very few firms scrutinise their server logs, with most discovery
being advised by external bodies, such as customers, financial
institutions or fraud agencies. It is encouraging to see that
three years later [53], the time between breach to discovery
has been drastically reduced. This still leaves a large gap
where compromised systems may still be under the control of
malicious users, which is a worry. Thus, in addition to making
the simple suggestions we propose above, cloud users should
also make sure they actually review their audit trail logs. It is
vital to understand when a security breach has occurred, which
records have been accessed, compromised or stolen. While this
is not a foolproof method of achieving cloud security, it is an
effective first step to help deliver far higher affordable security
than many companies currently achieve.
The authors have over 50 years of experience of audit and
internal audit in industry between them, and this knowledge
has been brought to bear in addressing this work. This initial
review of the state of the art raises serious concerns over how
little is being done. With some input from and partnership
with the accounting profession, it may be possible to work to
achieve far more effective levels of cloud audit, which in turn,
can lead to better levels of security being achieved.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have looked at some of the challenges facing companies
who seek to obtain good cloud security assurance. We have
seen how weaknesses in standard CSP SLAs can impact on
cloud security. We have identified cloud security standards
issues, and how that might impact cloud security. We have
considered how the lack of accountability can impact security.
We have discussed how these issues must also be addressed.
The practice of using default settings when installing
software in a cloud environment is clearly asking for trouble,
yet still persists. The simple steps proposed by the authors
are relatively easy to implement, need not be particularly
expensive to implement and maintain, and providing some on-
going monitoring of the audit trail logs is carried out, will
certainly prove beneficial. Inspecting the logs need not be
challenging or costly — there are many software solutions
available to address this task. Complicated solutions generally
lead to complex problems, as the more complex the solution,
the more the risk of ineffective configuration and maintenance
can lead to compromise in security. Yet all too often, the simple
steps that can really help improve security are ignored.
We certainly believe that more work needs to be done
in this area, and it would be beneficial to encourage the
accounting audit profession to get involved. After all, it is
their neck on the block when they sign off an audit, and
anything that can reduce risk to themselves, as well as their
clients, has to be a good thing. We have touched on how
these difficult areas of security might easily be approached
as part of a comprehensive security solution using simple
and inexpensive methods. Clearly, companies could benefit
from further research in several of these areas. It is also
clear that no one profession is equipped to deal with this
challenge. However, we would caution that action is needed
now, not several years down the line when research reaches
a more complete level of success in these areas. The threat
environment is too dangerous. Companies have to act now to
try to close the door, otherwise it may be too late.
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